because "it eschews a whole-population approach to the problem of poor nutrition and is therefore likely to be ineffective. " But why assume it must altogether eschew such an approach? Surely we should pull all available levers to fight obesity: both "whole-population" policies (e.g. making lettuce cheaper than Mars bars) and carrot and stick policies (e.g. giving a prize to individuals who buy and consume lettuce and a penalty to those who buy Mars bars). Even if the fundamental causes of obesity lie upstream of individual choice, carrots and sticks can motivate individuals to protect themselves better from these causes (if we failed to make it cheaper to grow and transport lettuce, we can still subsidize lettuce-a carrot-or impose fat taxes on Mars bars-a stick).
Goldberg questions my take on policies that tackle obesity, smoking etc., through fat taxes, cigarette taxes, and the like. And he warns that carrot and stick policies can stigmatize patients. As he rightly points out, even if taxes and stigma improve health, they might wrack more socio-economic damage than the health improvement is worth. Nevertheless, they might also improve health and wellbeing far more than they wrack socioeconomic damage. For example, cigarette taxes and smoking zoning laws seem to work well against smoking and the related morbidity and mortality, arguably well enough to warrant the otherwise somewhat unfair socio-economic effects on smokers, including some stigma. Instead of having to endorse or reject this or that type of policy wholesale, we can accept that carrot and stick policies have a potential for worsening socioeconomic injustices, and so should be used only with care-roughly, when their good effect on health outweighs any bad effect in other departments.
Lachlan Forrow writes at one point, "any conditions that the doctor imposes on [his or her] commitment to help [the patient] threaten the very nature of medicine". A response to my article on doctors who reject obese patients, this reads like a critique of any conditional treatment. Such a critique would seem unmotivated by Forrow's argument. What he argues, based on a case from his practice, is only that, "every patient needs and deserves a doctor who they know truly cares. " As the case demonstrates, this is about the doctor's caring attitude (and oral expressions thereof), not primarily about her actions. Since offering incentives that encourage healthier choice can, according to Forrow, make "eminent sense from a policy perspective, " why associate such conditioning with presumptive lack of caring or commitment to the patient's health? A critique of some motivations behind policy does not count against that policy.
I should again add that it can actually be important for doctors to function as gatekeepers and guardians of public health, and not always as fierce advocates for their own patients. Absolute commitment to an individual patient-in action or attitude-is sometimes wrong (6) .
Let me end with a concession and a refinement of my thesis. Ventakapuram's example of bariatric surgery is excellent, and it illustrates well that (as he puts it) the "rule of thumb" that I proposed is best understood as a "soft principle", which admits of exceptions. It is, therefore, only typically wrong to condition the very aid that patients need in order to become healthier on success in becoming healthier. Empirical evidence could establish whether such conditioning is promising in a given setting. What must not happen is that absent specific evidence for such policies in a given setting and without rapid impact assessments etc., such conditioning would roll out, on the false assumption that it usually works well. While I have elsewhere pointed to problems with personal responsibility for health policies, Ventakapuram, Goldberg, and Forrow overstate those problems. I remain grateful for their interesting replies to my piece.
Ethical issues
Not applicable.
